What does 'likely' mean, when respondents estimate the risk to become a victim of crime? Victimization risks can either be interpreted as gains ("being spared of offences") or as losses ("becoming a victim of crime"). Because losses are perceived as more severe, respondents will state lower subjective victimization probabilities in the loss-frame, compared to the gain-frame. We demonstrate such a framing-effect with data from an experimental survey. Furthermore, we show that the meaning of vague quantifiers varies with the frequency and the severity of the event. Respondents assign to the same vague quantifiers (e.g. 'unlikely') higher likelihoods in terms of percentages for frequent and for less severe events than for infrequent and for severe events. Because respondents do not use vague quantifiers consistently, it is problematic to compare subjective risks for different victimizations.
"And probably is a word whose weight is incalculable."
"South of the border, west of the sun", Haruki Murakami (2000) The popular Japanese writer Haruki Murakami is pointing to a problem, which is not only raised in literature, but in science as well. When you walk through a scientific library, you come across entire book shelves dealing with the issue. Nevertheless, scientists are not satisfied with statements that the values of phrases like "for a while" or "probably" are simply immeasurable. Several attempts have been made to quantify such vague quantifiers. Simpson's (1944) essay was one of the first, which dealt with expressions of frequency and their related meaning. In the meanwhile, it has been uncovered that the relation between verbal expressions and quantitative measures bears high uncertainty.
We can distinguish between intraindividual and interindividual differences (Budescu & Wallsten, 1995, p. 289 f.) . Hakel (1969, p. 533) states the problem of interindividual differences quite clearly with his often quoted remark, "one man's ‚rarely' is another man's ‚hardly ever'". Bradburn & Miles (1979, p. 94) described with a compelling example intraindividual differences: "The mean response for ‚sometimes' in the shooting in Hollywood westerns context is higher than the mean response for ‚very often' in the context of earthquakes." For survey methodology, the meaning of vague quantifiers is of particular interest, as we infer from frequency statements in questionnaires the validity of theories.
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The goal of our study is to improve our understanding of respondents' interpretation of probability expressions. Such interpretations have two aspects; first the perception and secondly the communication of probabilities. We conducted two analyses with a focus on subjective probabilities to become a victim of crime. In our first analysis, we demonstrate the liability of subjective perceptions of victimization probabilities. We show that subjective victimization probabilities are prone to framing-effects. Our second analysis focuses on the communication of victimization probabilities. Here, we show that the framing of victimization scenarios has an impact on the meaning of vague quantifiers. In particular, we show that the frame of reference determines the mapping of probabilities.
This effect can mainly be explained by the different frequency of the particular event: 'To become a victim' is rarer than 'not to become a victim'. We argue with Bradburn & Miles (1979, p. 94 However, the usage of vague quantifiers often implies biased comparability of item responses (Schnell & Kreuter, 2000; Kreuter, 2002, p. 226-229) . Nevertheless, they are still applied despite the availability of alternatives such as measurement via numerical frequency scales. So why is it that we still use vague quantifiers instead of asking for the precise value?
First of all it can be said that vague quantifiers are the natural answer to many questions (Wallsten, Budescu, Zwick, & Kemp, 1993) . The question about the rate of happiness in the past week is difficult to answer with precise frequency measures. Thus, interviewees prefer to answer such questions verbally and not numerically (Moxey & Sanford, 2000) .
In contrast, it is preferred to receive information numerically (Budescu & Wallsten, 1995, p. 298) . If interviewees are nevertheless asked to quantify their answers, most answer the question after some time of reflection. Only very few refuse an answer (Bradburn & 2 Depending on whether losses in terms of side effects or gains in terms of being spared of cancer are stressed, patients make decisions in favour of or against medical check-ups. Miles, 1979, 95) . However, precise quantitative evaluations are difficult and require high cognitive efforts (Peters, McCaul, Stefanek, & Nelson, 2006, p. 46) . Thus, much time and concentration is needed for the interview. In addition, it occurs that in fact there is no precise answer but the respondent makes up the quantitative information randomly (Conrad, Brown, & Cashman, 1998, p. 363) . Furthermore, answers to retrospective questions are influenced by the respondents' strategy to derive an exact answer (Conrad, Brown, & Cashman, 1998) . Depending on the nature and the frequency of the incident, the respondent counts his experiences, makes an extrapolation or generates a number from the data known to him from other sources. It is however not apparent to the interviewer, which strategy was chosen for which question. As a consequence, the precision of the information remains uncertain.
As numeric answers often suggest an artificial degree of precision, which is not reflected by respondents' characteristics, it seems more adequate to use vague quantifiers -if we only knew what they meant. If it were known, which vague quantifier is related to which numeric value, it was possible to use the more comprehensible method of vague quantifiers in surveys and to translate their meaning afterwards into quantitative information.
The mapping method serves this purpose in allocating numeric values to vague quantifiers (Wright, Gaskell, & O'Muircheartaigh, 1994, p. 481) .
The theoretical foundation of the mapping method can be found in the concept of membership functions (Hammerton, 1976) . In particular, it is assumed that verbal probability expressions are imprecise concepts, which can be represented by numeric probabilities between 0 and 1. The membership function for a specific verbal expression assigns a number to each value between 0 and 1. This number defines the degree of consistency between the verbal expression and the numeric probability: "Probability phrases are vague concepts and (…) different numerical probabilities in the [0, 1] range are represented to various degrees in these concepts. (…) The membership function of any given phrase assigns a number to each value on the probability line [0, 1] that represents its degree of membership in the concept defined by the phrase." (Karelitz & Budescu, 2004, p. 27 ).
Early studies assumed for each verbal expression only one membership function (Hammerton, 1976) . But soon, it was realized that membership functions and mapping techniques can be largely influenced by various factors. Psychological studies often emphasize the importance of the context. Goocher (1965) argues that mapping depends on respondents' affection for the object. The more respondents like an event or an object, the smaller the frequency expressions used. Pepper & Prytulak (1974) and Moxey & Sanford (1993 , 2000 demonstrate the effect of base rate expectations: "In particular, if an event has a high base-rate expectation, such as people enjoying parties, then the values assigned to (say) many in many people enjoyed the party is higher than it is for a low baserate expectation (as in many of the doctors in the hospital were female)." (Moxey & Sanford, 2000, p. 241) . Furthermore, Schwarz, Hippler, Deutsch & Strack (1985) stress the impact of scaling. If the lower part of the scale is subdivided into many subtle categories, respondents state lower TV consumption compared to if the upper part of the scale is strongly subdivided. 3 Finally, Hörmann (1983) and Newstead & Cov-entry (2000) show that the size of the particular object in the question matters: "[A] few people in front of a building meant more than a few people standing in front of a hut" (Newstead & Coventry, 2000, p. 244) .
So far, we dealt with cases, for which the interpretation of vague quantifiers affect all respondents similarly. However, cases are even more problematic, in which the interpretation of vague quantifiers affect particular groups differently. It is possible that regression estimates of group differences for particular opinions or attitudes are not due to actual group differences in these opinions but to group differences in interpreting the scales. Schaeffer (1991) could demonstrate such an effect. He asked black and white respondents to specify their frequency of being bored. When using numeric values, he found no differences. However, when asked with vague quantifiers, black respondents answered to be more frequently bored than white respondents. Furthermore, Nakao & Axelrod (1983) show such group differences between doctors and patients in interpreting verbal frequency expressions like "infrequent" or "not frequently". Finally, King, Murray, Salomon & Tandon (2004) demonstrate cultural differences in using response scales.
Wänke (2002) highlighted the importance of reference groups. Students, who compare themselves with the entire population, estimate the frequency of going to the cinema higher than those comparing themselves to other students. Likewise, the field of reference matters. "For example, when judging how often one goes to the movies, the 1988; Menon, Raghubir & Schwarz, 1995) . In addition, similar effects occurred when patients reported on their rate of suffering from physical symptoms (Schwarz & Scheuring, 1992) .
response may depend on whether one compares this behaviour to the frequency one attends poetry readings or watches TV." (Wänke, 2002, p 
Perception of probabilities
We know that the subjective perceptions of probabilities are prone to presentational effects. Tversky & Kahneman (1981) describe in their classic study on framing two alternative scenarios for fighting an epidemic; a safe and a risky one. In one case, the result is described in terms of saved lives, in the other in terms of lives lost. Although both scenarios have the same statistical expectation value and are formally equivalent, respondents choose the risky option when confronted with the loss-frame (number of lives lost), and the safe option when confronted with the gain-frame (number of lives saved).
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) suggests that a different point of reference is induced if a decision problem is presented in terms of gains compared to losses.
Thus, the reference point differs between decisions which focus on gains and decisions which focus on losses. The first assumption in prospect theory states that the value function is concave for gains and convex for losses. The second assumption is that the value function is steeper for losses than for gains. It can be inferred from these properties that an event with the same probability of occurrence is psychologically more relevant in the loss-frame compared to the gain-frame. In other words: To suffer from a particular loss with a likelihood of 5% is more relevant than the chance of being spared from the same loss with a likelihood of 95%.
McNeil, Pauker, Sox & Tversky (1982) could demonstrate this effect in clinical settings.
Patients had to decide whether they prefer a safe radio therapy or rather a risky surgery.
In one condition, the likelihoods were presented in terms of death rates and in the other condition in terms of survival chances. If risks were presented in terms of death rates, fewer patients chose the risky surgery, compared to when risks were presented in terms of survival chances. For an overview of such framing effects in medical research see Marteau (1989) , Banks, Salovey, Greener, Rothman, Moyer, Beauvais & Epel (1995) and Edwards, Elwyn, Covey, Matthews & Pill (2001) . Moxey & Sanford (2000) show similar effects for consumption decisions. The respondents were given two logically equivalent options to choose from -for instance 95% fat free yoghurt and yoghurt containing 5% fat. Most favour the 95% fat free yoghurt. It is argued that the wording causes this effect -in one case, the focus is on the positive aspect (fat free), in the other case, the attention is drawn to the negative aspect. The result that logically equivalent expressions are evaluated differently was already confirmed by Reyna (1981) . She investigated the effect of negations of modal adjectives (e.g. probably or possibly). It could be shown that formal negations do not automatically imply complementary numerical estimations. 
Hypotheses
We can derive the following hypotheses by applying former reasoning to subjective probability estimates of victimizations: Respondents prefer to face a situation with a 95 % probability of not becoming a victim of crime compared to a situation with a 5 % probability to become a victim of crime. We argue that the optimism in the gain frame is due to a relatively lower subjective victimization probability, compared to the loss frame. As a consequence it is expected that the probability of being spared of victimization (gain frame) is downgraded such that it corresponds subjectively with the probability to become a victim of crime (loss frame). For example, the feeling of security for facing a '90 % likelihood of being spared' might be psychologically equivalent to a '5 % likelihood to become victim of crime'. We summarize our reasoning in our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The subjective victimization probability will be higher in the gain frame (being spared of a crime) compared to the loss frame (become a victim of crime).
Method
We conducted in August 2006 an experimental survey in Leipzig, Germany. We asked 95 taxi drivers and 96 waiters (N=191) for an estimate of their probability to become a victim of crime. We presented short scenarios for five different sorts of crime, in particular for being involved in a car accident, bill-dodging, theft, robbery and murder. We chose taxi drivers and waiters because both groups do their job in public and thus both are exposed to a higher risk of victimization. The respondents were selected by a twostage sample, with taxi stands and restaurants as the first stage and respondents as the second stage. We drew a random sample of the list of all taxi stands from the taxi cooperation in Leipzig. At each of the taxi stands, we approached the second taxi in the row, and repeated this process for every second taxi in the row. To select the waiters, we took a random sample from the list of the IHK Leipzig (industry and trade organization Leipzig), containing all registered restaurants. We used the last birthday method to select the waiters in a restaurant. The two versions of the questionnaire were randomized.
Four interviewers conducted oral face-to-face interviews with two versions of the standardized questionnaire, which differed in the frames of presenting the probabilities. We asked half of the respondents to estimate their probability to become a victim of crime (loss-frame), while the other half was asked to estimate the probability of being spared of a crime (gain frame). Furthermore, the questionnaire contained a control question for the victimization 'robbery'. The control group had to respond the question twice in the loss frame and the experimental group had to respond the question once in the lossframe and once in the gain-frame (intra-individual variation of the frame). In addition, respondents had first to evaluate their probabilities on a verbal scale using vague quantifiers and then on numerical scales (see 
Results
First, we demonstrate framing-effects on numerical scales for subjective probabilities of victimization. We compare the distribution of numerical victimization probabilities in the gain-frame with the respective distribution in the loss-frame. We analyze the offences theft, robbery and car accident (question 9).
Figure 1 about here (see appendix II)
The data confirm hypothesis 1 for the offences robbery and theft: Respondents estimate higher victimization probabilities in the gain-frame, compared to the loss frame. For fur-ther comparisons and for significance tests, we compare arithmetic means (see table 2 in the appendix I). For the offences robbery and theft, probability estimates in the gain frame differ from those in the loss-frame in the expected direction. For instance, the mean chance of being robbed is 35.5 % in the gain frame compared to 21.9 % in the loss-frame (p < 0.01). For theft, hypothesis 1 can be confirmed as well (p < 0.01). However, for the offence car accident, hypothesis 1 cannot be confirmed. The values are very close to each other (51.4 % in the loss frame versus 48.8 % in the gain frame). This might be due to the fact that car accidents are very frequent events. In summary, we can confirm hypothesis 1 for the offences robbery and theft. Respondents perceive higher victimization probabilities if asked for being spared of crimes compared to being asked to become a victim of crime.
Communication of victimization probabilities

Hypotheses
Our first study demonstrated that the frame of reference affects the perception of victimization probabilities. Now, we elaborate our findings in a second study. We show that the frame of reference affects the communication of victimization probabilities. Thus, we argue that the framing of risks affects both, the perception and the communication of probabilities. Differences in the communication of risks can be represented such that the verbal expressions "likely" or "unlikely" have different meanings in different situations.
Therefore, we study variation in the assignment of numerical values to vague quantifiers. We argue that respondents assign lower numerical values for rarer incidents than for more frequent incidents. Bradburn & Miles (1979, p. 94 ) already speculated that "in short ‚often' for an improbable event is less than often for a highly probable event." In our case, we make use of our different versions of the questionnaires for gains and for losses. These two versions represent a randomization of different frequencies of events.
The event to become a victim of a particular crime is rarer than the event to be spared of the same crime. Consequently, we analyze whether respondents assign different numerical values to the same vague quantifiers (e.g. likely) in the gain-frame compared to the loss-frame. Respondents are expected to assign to the event 'become a victim of robbery' lower numerical values compared to the event 'being spared of robbery'. 6 We formulate hypothesis 2 as follows:
Hypothesis 2: In the gain-frame (e.g. being spared of robbery), a particular verbal answer category (e.g. likely) corresponds with higher numerical probabilities than in the loss-frame (e.g. become a victim of robbery).
In a consecutive step, we analyze whether the response functions decrease with the severity of the offence. In other words, we argue that for more severe offences, a "likely" victimization refers to lower probabilities than for less severe offences. 6 The frequency effect can be derived from Grice' logic of conversation (Grice, 1993) . Here, it is assumed that the respondent answers in accordance with the principle of relevance and with reference to the category of relation. When the respondent is asked to estimate the probability to become a victim of robbery in terms of absolute probabilities, the expected answer will be around "very unlikely". As other respondents will give a similar answer this information would not be relevant. Following Grice' reasoning, the respondent rather assumes that her probability estimate in relation to all other respondents' estimates will be of interest. Therefore, the respondent will anchor the answer scale at her assumed average probability and adjust her own subjective probability accordingly. For a more detailed description of the "anchoring and adjustment heuristic" see Peters, McCaul, Stefanek & Nelson (2006) . Note that this answering process is independent of the frequency of the event and can be applied to numerical as well as to verbal answer scales. However, when using a verbal scale, the focus is on qualitative considerations (Zimmer, 1983; Budescu & Wallsten, 1995, p. 303) . If the own probability is evaluated in relation to the expected average probability of the others and this average probability is anchored to the midpoint of the answer scale, a relevant and relational answer is possible for both, the frequent event ('being spared of robbery') and the rare event ('become victim of robbery'). In case of the numerical scale, quantitative considerations are primarily of interest. Therefore, the anchor for frequent events ('being spared of robbery') is set higher than for rare events ('become victim of robbery'). This explains the frequency effect in the mappinganalysis.
Hypothesis 3: With increasing severity of the offence, the slope of the response functions between vague quantifiers and numerical values decreases.
For example, we expect that respondents mean with "likely" lower likelihoods, when they refer to becoming a victim of murder compared to becoming a victim of bill-dodging. 
Frequency of victimizations and communication patterns
We estimate six linear bivariate OLS-regressions. We map the verbal probability statements on the numeric percentage scales for the victimizations robbery, theft and car crash (question 9). We estimate the regressions separately for the gain-and for the loss-frame. We plot the resulting response functions graphically for each victimization (Wright, Gaskell & O'Muircheartaigh, 1994, p. 481 ).
8 The x-axis represents the verbal answer scales and the y-axis the values of the percentage scales.
Figure 2-4 about here (see appendix II)
We can confirm hypothesis 2 for all victimizations. In the gain-frame (thus the more frequent event), vague quantifiers correspond to higher likelihoods than in the loss-frame, as shown in figures 2-4. For theft and robbery, we observe considerable differences be-7 The two dimensions 'frequency' and 'severity' of an offence could not be manipulated independently of each other. In order to exclude a possible confounding of the two effects, applications to enable to separate both manipulations could be developed in future studies. A conceivable possibility in medicine would be to analyze different types of cancer in order to manipulate 'frequency' (disease risk) and 'severity' (mortality risk) independently of each other. For a more detailed discussion of this subject in the medical context see Weber & Hilton (1990) , Merz, Druzdzel & Mazur (1991) , Sutherland, Lockwood, Trichtler, Sem, Brooks & Till (1991) , and Budescu & Wallsten (1995, p. 294) . 8 In their study on mapping of vague quantifiers, Wright, Gaskell, & O'Muircheartaigh (1994) also compute OLS regressions and interpret the resulting regression lines as "response functions".
tween 20-25% for the two respective response functions. We refer to the appendix I for exact values of the regression estimates.
So far, we investigated inter-personal effects. However, the intra-personal test reveals even greater magnitude. Here, the same respondent estimates twice her likelihood to become a victim of robbery; once for gains and once for losses. We randomly allocated two groups to two different conditions. The experimental group had first to estimate the likelihood to become a victim of robbery (question 1, loss-frame). After some questions, they were asked to evaluate their likelihood of being spared to become a victim of robbery (question 9, gain-frame). The control group answered twice the question to become victim of crime (question 1 and 9 twice in the loss-frame). We report differences in response functions in figure 5 and 6.
Figure 5 and 6 about here (see appendix II)
The same respondent assigns higher percentages to equivalent verbal probability expressions in the gain-frame compared to the loss-frame. In contrast, persons who answered the same question twice in the loss-frame gave consistent answers. Thus, results for hypothesis 2 can be confirmed with intra-personal tests as well. We conclude that respondents communicate with identical vague quantifiers higher subjective probabilities in cases of frequent incidents compared to rare events. With increasing frequency of the events, the intercepts of the response functions shift upwards.
Severity of victimizations and communication patterns
In hypothesis 3 we argue that with increasing severity of the offence, the slope of the response function between vague quantifiers and numerical values decreases. We con-firm hypothesis 3 with our analysis visualized in figure 7: With increasing severity, measured by the particular kind of victimization, (ascending: bill-dodging, robbery, murder), identical verbal likelihood expressions correspond to lower numerical probabilities.
The slopes for the response functions are as follows: Bill-dodging: b = 13.6; robbery: b = 9.2; murder: b = 7.3. See appendix I for more details.
Figure 7 about here
Comparisons between different offences reveal that respondents mean by similar verbal probability expressions different likelihoods. For example, "very likely" to become a victim of murder states a lower likelihood than a "very likely" to become a victim of billdodging. In particular, the verbal label "very likely" for murder refers to a likelihood lower than 40% compared to the verbal label "very likely" for bill-dodging, which refers to a likelihood higher than 60%.
Discussion
The frame of reference has great impact on the perception and communication of probability statements. We demonstrate a wording effect on subjective probability estimates.
Respondents give different estimates for personal victimizations if survey questions are worded differently. The subjective probability estimates differ depending on whether respondents are asked for the risk to become a victim of a particular crime or for the risk of being spared of a particular crime. Furthermore, we show that the same verbal probability expressions have different meanings in different situations. On the one hand, "likely" refers to lower probabilities in cases of rarer events ('become victim') compared to more frequent events ('being spared'). On the other hand, a "likely" victimization refers to lower probabilities in cases of more severe victimizations compared to less severe victimizations.
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In conclusion, direct comparisons between proportions of different victimizations on categorical answer scales can be regarded as problematic, because interpretations of answer categories depend on the wording, the frequency and the severity of the offence. A promising alternative to verbal answer scales were frequency formats to capture subjective victimization risks. Frequency formats are based on findings of cognitive psychology, according to which the presentation and communication of statistical information in form of frequencies is more intuitive and understandable than alternative forms of presentation such as probabilities and percentages: "Natural frequencies facilitate inferences because they carry implicit information about base rates (…). They also correspond to the way in which humans have experienced statistical information over most of their history." (Hoffrage, Lindsey, Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 2000 , p. 2261 . A known problem is the subjective overestimation of risks associated with rare events (fictitious example: "How likely is it that a randomly selected person from your neighbourhood will become a victim of a robbery during the next 12 months?"). Formulating items to measure subjective risks in terms of frequencies encourages distributional thinking and results in more realistic estimates of the base rate (fictitious example: "Imagine 1000 people from your neighbourhood. How many of these people will become a victim of a robbery during the next 12 months?"). As Teigen (1974) shows, subjective overestimation of small probabilities decreases when respondents estimate risks in frequencies rather than probabilities. Coutts (2002) points out that frequency formats ("distributional perspective") lead to more realistic, lower estimates of offence-specific victimization risks than other formats ("singular perspective").
Further research might investigate differences in framing-effects for verbal and numerical scales. It can be argued that context effects should be even stronger for verbal scales (Moxey & Sanford, 2000, p. 238; Welkenhuysen, Evers-Kiebooms & D'Ydewalle, 2001 11 To account for possible cluster-effects, robust standard errors were estimated in addition (Huber-WhiteSandwich-Variance-Estimator). As expected, the standard errors slightly increased. However, our conclusions remain valid. On this account, these results are not reported. The supplemental estimations can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
